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In the last decades, experimental philosophers have introduced the
notion that conceptual analysis could use empirical evidence to back some
of its claims. This opens up the possibility for the development of a corpus-
based conceptual analysis. However, progress in this direction is contingent
on the development of a proper account of concepts and corpus-based
conceptual analysis itself that can be leveraged on textual data. In this
essay, I address this problem through the question of similarity: how do we
evaluate similarity between two concepts, as similarity relates to identity?
After a survey of prominent conceptual analysis methods, I propose a
cursory account of corpus-based conceptual analysis. Then I formulate
the question of similarity, and argue for an account that is functionalist
in Millikan’s (1984) sense. In this process, I propose a new account of
concept that bases itself on millikanian teleosemantics in order to account
for concepts’ contribution in discourse. I then illustrate its fruitfulness by
showing how it enables accounts of concept presence detection in textual
data, both automatically and by a human judge.
Say a philosopher, named Alice, wants to study a given concept—in particular,
she wants a picture of how it is being used. She gathers a very large corpus, large
enough that for most concepts, she will have enough instances in the text so
that she can observe the full variety in kinds of sentences, narratives, arguments
and contexts in which it is used. In other words, her corpus is large enough to
assume that it is representative of the kinds of discourses that run within the
context where it was collected. As a very competent reader, Alice can intuitively
pick up concepts when they are used.
However, she can hardly translate this “picking up concept” into a set of proce-
dures1. Indeed, this “picking up concepts” should not be assimilated with, say,
1A reviewer brought to my attention an argument that can be brought up against any
empirically based conceptual analysis that resorts to studying folks’ understanding of a concept.
Say we want to study ordinary people’s knowledge of a concept, then we have to grant that the
participants of our study understand the concept in question. But then, if it is folk knowledge,
admittedly it shared by all the community, and unless the researcher is from a different culture,
then she should also understand the concept as well as her subject. Why, then, doesn’t she
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picking up words that stand for it: concepts are often implicit, and they may
exert their influence on a text’s content and structure without there being a
word or set of words that make reference to it. When Alice picks up a concept’s
presence in the text, she is not merely recognizing material shapes, but recogniz-
ing the concept’s role in the discourse’s structure, at least as she understands it.
This kind of operation is opaque even from Alice’s point of view: while we can
learn to better read and understand from others, we cannot tell exactly which
operations take us from ink shapes to a certain concept.
In this scenario, if Alice has read the corpus, she probably has strong grounds
for trusting herself with the various judgments that she makes as part of her
interpretative activity. So long as she trusts her competence as a reader, she
could go through the texts, identify the sentences which mobilize the concept
she is interested in, and make an inventory of what the corpus tells us about
it. The problem is that she probably lacks the time and resources to read the
whole corpus by herself. As she needs to outsource parts of her reading and
interpretative process in order to be able to treat massive amounts of data, she
might not be able to trust the results of this outsourcing, even if she knows
which operations are being performed. Given the opacity of her competence as a
reader, even a simple operation such as detecting a concept in the text becomes
a challenge.
An algorithm that detects the presence of concepts in textual data, such as the
ones developed by researchers of the LANCI in the last decade (e.g. Chartrand
et al. 2016; Pulizzotto et al. 2016; Chartrand, Cheung, and Bouguessa 2017)2,
might go a long way towards helping Alice. Indeed, given the importance of con-
cepts in philosophical practice, we have speculated that the lack of computational
tools to detect concepts in textual data is one of the reasons why philosophy
is lagging behind other disciplines of social science and of the humanities with
regards to the penetration of natural language processing and text mining in the
research practice (Chartrand et al. 2016). While there is some opacity in the
way these algorithms make their interpretative decisions, computer scientists will
usually lean on our faith in human judgment in order to validate their algorithms:
they engineer and evaluate them by comparing them to what humans would do
when they perform the same operation. For example, Chartrand, Cheung, and
simply reflect on her concept, and produce an account of it from her armchair?
An obvious answer is that the researcher might be more interested in about the concept than
simply her personal account of it, which might skewed by her social positioning and personal
history. However, there is more to it, as this argument fails if we distinguish, as we have done
here, between the capacity to use a concept in everyday uses, such as discourse structuring or
comprehension or for producing statements about the world, and the capacity to represent
that concept as an object for discussion (or, in other words, to make it explicit). We might
call the first kind of capacity “operative knowledge” of the concept being inquired, and the
second kind might be called the “theoretical knowledge” of the concept. At the beginning of
the study, we might grant the researcher an operative knowledge of the concept she wishes to
study, but what she is looking for is a theoretical knowledge of it—she is certainly not looking
for information she already has.
Cf. also footnote 10 on page 11.
2See also Chartrand (2019).
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Bouguessa (2017) had participants annotate text segments for the presence of a
concept, and evaluated their method against this metric.
One might argue that this strategy of relying on the trust we have on human
competence merely displaces the problem. Indeed, in practice, even getting
annotators to make the right calls require that the annotation protocol be well
thought through—short of which they might be fulfilling a different task. This,
in turn, requires that we have a good understanding of what it is to detect
concept presence in text.
In post-war analytic philosophy, the association of conceptual analysis with a
priori (non-empirical) knowledge (e.g. Jackson 1998) has meant that questions
pertaining to topics such as the observability of concepts in empirical data
have remained underdeveloped. While recent discussions around experimental
philosophy and its methods have led to some progress on this topic, the focus
on adapting methods from cognitive and social psychology on one side and on
the role of intuitions on the other has meant that little has been developed
to characterize the role of concepts in natural language. On the other hand,
concepts have been discussed as instantiated in language, such as in the notion
of “lexical concept”, but it is often in a very limited role, where the concept is
viewed as attached to a particular expression or lexical pattern, which typically
brings up the concept in question by referring to it (e.g. Fodor 1998; Evans
2006). But concepts in discourse are often implicit; they may have an important
role in structuring narratives or discourses without being attached to specific
expressions. Conceptual analysis would be incomplete if it failed to account for
the roles a concept plays when it is not directly expressed through reference.
Therefore, while it is probably true that the lack of algorithmic tools is an
obstacle to the development of corpus-based conceptual analysis, it also seems
that it is in need of a proper account of concepts (as it plays a role both in
formulating a question in conceptual analysis and in concept detection) and
corpus-based conceptual analysis itself3.
In this essay, I address this problem through the question of similarity: how do
we evaluate similarity between two concepts, as similarity relates to identity?
Concepts are public entities, and they achieve their roles by being repeated from
an instance to another. However, individual humans likely don’t internalize
concepts exactly the same way, which is to say that we likely have slightly
different accounts of the same concepts. Furthermore, as we keep learning
and updating these accounts, it is likely that those also change across time—I
probably don’t have the same account of the concept of CAT (the animal) as
when I was five years old. Still, we say of my current concept of CAT that
3 Not to be confused with, for example, Meunier et al.’s (2005) Computer-Assisted Con-
ceptual Analysis of Text. Meunier et al.’s aim is to unearth associations of a concept (as
it is explicitly employed in text) in order to contribute new knowledge to an interpretation.
Corpus-based conceptual analysis, in contrast, shares a similar objective with experimental
philosophy as it is employed for the sake of conceptual analysis: namely, the idea is to give an
account of a concept as it is employed in relevant linguistic behaviour.
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it is the same (in the relevant sense) as the concept of CAT that I had as a
five-years-old. How do we judge this identity?
As we shall see, this question poses itself slightly differently in the context of
conceptual analysis and in the context of concept detection. However, I will
argue that there can be a single answer to these two varieties of the similarity
problem.
This essay is divided in two broad sections. In section , I compare various ways
of understanding conceptual analysis: the method of cases (and Machery’s (2017)
understanding of it in particular), Haslanger’s (2012) three types of conceptual
analysis, and Carnap’s (1950) explication. I propose that these accounts are
mostly complementary, and offer a synthesis. In section , I formulate and
address the problem of similarity. I assess three ways of understanding Carnap’s
similarity criterion: intension, extension and function; and I argue that similarity
by function is superior to its alternatives. To replace Carnap’s vague account
of function, I offer a millikanian account of it, and I show how it translates
into an account of the concept of CONCEPT and into a heuristics to measure
similarity between concepts. Finally, in section , I illustrate how the millikanian
framework, and in particular similarity as function, plays out in corpus-based
analysis and in concept presence detection in particular.
Varieties of conceptual analysis
When talking about conceptual analysis in philosophy, two different ideas come
to mind.
Firstly, in the mind of most analytic philosophers, the term “conceptual analysis”
conjures a specific type of proposition, with the concept that is being analyzed
(the analysandum) on one side, its deconstruction into other concepts on the
other (the analysans), and an operator that asserts some form of identity between
the two terms. Usually, this proposition expresses the analysans in the form of
necessary and sufficient conditions: for instance, “a brother is a male sibling”
expresses that the concept BROTHER can be analyzed into the concepts MALE
and SIBLING, with both being necessary conditions for BROTHER, and being
jointly sufficient. In this sense, a conceptual analysis is a form of representation.
It does not tell much about how we can arrive to propositions of this type, but
it does tell us about the constraints coming from the form and the properties
and paradoxes that come from it (Cf. King 1998; Jackson 2013).
The second sense that is associated with the term “conceptual analysis”, on the
other hand, speaks of method rather than form. To some philosophers (Lewis
1970; Jackson 1998; Chalmers and Jackson 2001), it evokes a method to produce
a proposition that would be a conceptual analysis in the first sense. Tradition-
ally, conceptual analysis has been mostly about unravelling “our” concept of
something, which a philosopher can often study through her own account of this
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concept, in a a priori manner—viz. without inquiring outside of the realm of
her own mind. But it need not be that way, and indeed, many (e.g. Haslanger
2012; Machery 2017) use this term to refer to explicitly empirical methods.
This section’s aim is to make a short review of current accounts of empirically
informed conceptual analysis. The motivation for this boils down to this: con-
ceptual analysis is the context within which we shall understand both concept
similarity and concepts themselves. In other words, our accounts of concepts and
concept similarity will be those that serve the account of conceptual analysis that
we shall adopt. Therefore, this section can be thought of as a clarification of the
main concerns of this article, those of concept similarity (how is it measured?)
and concept detection (how can it be theorized for operationalization?). In a first
subsection, I propose a historical perspective on the roots of conceptual analysis
in the naturalist/rationalist debate, with an eye for the a priori/a posteriori
debate, which has been polarizing the way we understand conceptual analysis
and engineering in philosophy, especially in the second half of last century. Then
I go on to describe the main frameworks through which the relation between
conceptual analysis and empirical data have been theorized in the last few years
– the method of cases, haslangerian analysis, and carnapian explication4. Finally,
I show how those different accounts fit together in the context of corpus-based
conceptual analysis.
Historical roots of conceptual analysis
While analysis has been a prominent part of the philosopher’s toolset for millennia,
we often trace back contemporary analysis to Kant and his analytic/synthetic
distinction. Kant is interested in statements as subject-predicate pairs, and calls
“analytic” those in which the predicate is contained in the subject and “synthetic”
for which it is not the case. For instance, the idea of having three sides is present
within the concept of TRIANGLE, thus “All triangles have three sides” is an
analytic statement. This dichotomy is closely associated to another, which deals
with the means of acquiring truth values for a statement: if we need experience
of the world to determine such truth values, then a statement is a posteriori, if
it can be determined without experiencing the world, then it is a priori. Kant
thought that there were no such things as analytic a posteriori statements, and
his successors mostly rejected the possibility of synthetic a priori statements,
4The reader could probably point out to other frameworks that could fit the bill. In
particular, one might argue that debates around natural kinds, for instance, should be
addressed. However, these accounts address a very limited subset of concepts: those whose
main goals are to refer to natural phenomena in ways that enable descriptions of the world
that are as accurate as possible. Not all language is scientific language, and for good reasons;
most concepts are adapted to other activities and fulfill other objectives which are not less
commendable (Cf. Haslanger 2012; Carus 2008). Furthermore, I have not addressed other
historically significant accounts of conceptual analysis, as I felt I should prioritize on current
accounts of conceptual analysis. Machery (2017) has addressed the same three frameworks,
admittedly for similar reasons.
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such that, for most purposes, these two dichotomies are usually addressed as a
single one, with the analytic a priori being opposed to synthetic a posteriori.
For the better part of the 20th century, analysis has thus been presented as
a polar opposite to empirical inquiry. This said, the place occupied by this
dichotomy in philosophy of science goes beyond the mere separation of analytic
from empirical truths, as a defining research question has been to deterine how
analytic truths are to be integrated in the body of scientific knowledge (Rey
2018). For instance, at least for the early Carnap of the Logische Aufbau der
Welt (Rudolf 1928), in order to have content, the theoretical terms with which
scientific theories and claims are formulated ought to be reducible to observation
terms. Analysis, or “rational reconstruction”, is thus the production of a form of
definition, whereby a scientific term is related through rules to observation terms.
Such definitions, however, have different conditions of adequacy than sentences
about empirical terms: whereas the latter gets a truth value when confronted
with observation, definitions are adequate if they reflect a convention (Rey
2018). As such, one must distinguish between the language in which empirical
statements are produced and the language of reconstruction, with the former
reflecting observation and experimentation, and the latter reflecting convention.
To a degree, one can thus see the project of the Aufbau as attempting to draw
a line between analysis and empirical inquiry and between the corresponding
languages and epistemologies, and attributing them their roles in the production
of scientific knowledge.
With Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” (Quine 1971), the debate eventually
becomes polarized between reformers of the project of the Aufbau—soon joined
by defenders of a priori methods of analysis—and defenders of naturalized
epistemology—often called respectively “rationalists” and “naturalists.” Rather
than reconstructing the meaning of empirical concepts through analysis, Quine’s
suggestion is that we study how the construction of these terms actually proceeds.
Knowledge is thus seen as a natural phenomenon, and the project of epistemology
should be to study where and how it emerges. The same goes for empirical
concepts, whose meanings are not to be determined by an elaborate definition
leading us all the way to a primordial empirical language, but by a function of
the processes of categorization they enable.
One of the central friction points is around the question of a priori statements.
A naturalized epistemology would seek to replace a priori analysis of empirical
terms with scientific accounts of those terms as they are reliably employed
(Rysiew 2017). On the surface, it might seem like it is just another, perhaps
more scientific, way of determining what our concepts are. However, rationalists
would argue that naturalists who think that they are turning their back on
a priori intuitions are in fact presuming or assuming them (e.g. Bealer and
Strawson 1992). For example, as Bealer suggests, we need to use intuitions to
determine what counts as empirical evidence rather than, say, a priori intuitions,
imaginations or memory. Alternatively, if our starting-point intuition about
mundane concepts were wildly unreliable, we might not be able to bootstrap
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them to acceptable concepts.
Prominent responses to this challenge often choose to concede Bealer’s point, to
the extent that they concede that empirical inquiries need a starting point. But
those starting-point judgments need not be interpreted as a priori. To Kornblith
and others (2002, 13), “the extent to which naive investigators agree in their
classifications is not evidence that these judgments somehow bypass background
empirical belief, but rather that background theory may be widely shared.” Even
judgments which seem to rely on information that we share from the moment
we are born are likely informed by lessons learned through our species’ evolution.
From Kornblith’s perspective, a priori judgments, or at least the judgments that
are referred to with this expression, exist and are relevant in epistemology, but
they are best explained as natural abilities that draw from experience, including
the experience of our ancestors.
It is unclear that this response really addresses the qualms of traditional episte-
mologists, as explaining intuitions as natural empirically-informed abilities relies
ultimately on intuitions, and this explanation isn’t available to the epistemic
agent at its starting point. On the other hand, Kornblith suggests that we
might not be more justified in trusting a priori intuitions whose legitimacy
seems somewhat supernatural. Thus the debate over the a priori takes a sort of
chicken-or-the-egg flavour: it seems to depend on which perspective—e.g. the
natural or the phenomenal—one is starting from.
The distance between naturalists and rationalists should not be overstated. On
the one hand, of course, Kornblith’s arguments does not target the practice of
using a priori intuitions, but rather suggests that the source of their legitimacy
do not lie where rationalists think it is. On the other hand, rationalists are not
necessarily opposed to the project of revising our account of knowledge in light
of discoveries in cognitive science (BonJour 2006), and neither do they take a
priori intuitions to be unrevisable in light of empirical knowledge (Bealer and
Strawson 1992).
Furthermore, the middle way between a “pure” naturalism and a “pure” tradi-
tional aprioristic epistemology is actually well-travelled. For instance, Goldman
(1986, 2005) has argued consistently that intuition-based conceptual investigation
must be the starting point of epistemological inquiries (Rysiew 2017). On his
account, intuitions can be interpreted as a window to our internal concepts, and
methods to elicit them can be seen as ways to gather evidence for conceptual
analysis. On the rationalist side of things, Canberra planners have gone so far as
to reclaim the “naturalist” label, in part because of their general commitment to
physicalism, and their lack of commitment to the primacy of the a priori over the
a posteriori (Braddon-Mitchell 2009). Moreover, the rationalist’s armchair often
looks suspiciously susceptible to empirical inquiry: for instance, the Canberra
planners’ “two-step” method for conceptual analysis begins by collecting all the
platitudes about this concept5 (Nolan 2009).
5There is some controversy around what should count as a platitude. Generally speaking,
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It would also be a mistake to associate empirical inquiry with the naturalists to
the exclusion of the rationalists on account of their positions with regards to
the a priori/a posteriori dichotomy. After all, the initial positivist project, as it
is developed in the Aufbau, far from developing a discipline disconnected from
empirical inquiry, portrays philosophy as “the handmaiden of science” (Braddon-
Mitchell 2009). Furthermore, this separation did not necessarily imply that the
analysis should stick to the armchair. It is explicitly in this spirit that Arne
Naess pioneered experimental methods strikingly similar to modern experimental
philosophy during his years attending the Vienna Circle, and while the project
has not been well received by all of the Vienna Circle regulars, Carnap himself
saw this as a positive development (Naess 1938; Murphy 2014).
More recent attempts at informing philosophers’ accounts of concepts are also
hard to split along the rationalist/naturalist lines, but a generalization can
perhaps be made: while naturalists analyze concepts to ensure that they capture
the right phenomena or objects, rationalists put more emphasis on capturing
our concept of something. This is not unexpected, as the naturalist project is
more about building concepts from observation and experimentation6, whereas
the rationalist project begins with an assessment of the concepts we have before
diving into data. A typical naturalist project would be, for instance, to determine
whether the physical extension of the concept MIND should be limited to the
brain or diffuse into a creature’s environment (cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998;
Hurley 1998; Clark 2008; Rupert 2009), and would draw heavily on research in
psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, etc. to argue for its case. Conversely,
more typical of a rationalist project would be to probe laypeople’s intuitions
about a concept in order to determine how they understand it.
Therefore, experimental philosophy, which will provide part of the framework
for contextualizing corpus-based concept analysis, is probably more rooted in
the rationalist tradition, and might be thought as the rationalist response to
the naturalists’ use of cognitive science research for their own projects. This is
evidenced by its focus on thought experiments and its methodological reliance on
intuitions. However, it is worth noting that not all of this focus is an endorsement:
in fact, while it is far from forming the bulk of the research in experimental
philosophy (cf. Knobe 2016), much of it is devoted to what has been dubbed the
negative program, viz. a critique of the reliance on intuitions in philosophy. As a
result, it is probably best to think of experimental philosophy having its roots
in both traditions.
these would be claims that reflect commonplace uses of the concept.
6While both are ways of capturing empirical data, experimental studies and observational
studies differ in the degree of control being exerted by the researcher. In experiments, the
phenomenon being studied is is provoked, typically in controlled conditions, such that causes
and effects can be isolated. In observational studies, the researcher has no control over the
phenomenon she is observing, she might make for more realistic environments, but makes it
more difficult to ascertain causality and to control for unwanted interactions, among other
things. While most of experimental philosophy has indeed been experimental, corpus analysis
would rather qualify as observation.
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The method of cases
The method of cases is, at its core, a sort of narrative that goes as follows. We
have a concept which we suspect to have a certain attribute. For instance, we
might imagine that in a categorization task—when judging whether a certain
limit-case object is a representative of the said concept, or not—we think that
having a certain feature is important in determining where it belongs. So we
think up cases or scenarios where the said feature can be isolated, and test our
judgment on it to see where it leads us. For example, Knobe (2003) suspects
that whether a side-effect is positive or negative can have an impact on whether
the person who brought it about is responsible for it or not. So he concocts this
scenario:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I
can. Let’s start the new program.’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was
harmed.
He tours around Central Park submitting either this case, or a similar one where
every instance of the verb “harm” is replaced by “help”, and asks whether the
chairman is responsible. As people are twice as likely to say he is in the “harm”
cases, Knobe concludes that the valence of the side-effect (its being good or bad)
is important in the folk concept of RESPONSIBILITY7.
Alternatively, one can do this kind of experiment esoterically, between the author
and its readers. The Gettier cases (Gettier 1963) are often understood like
this: Gettier thinks that there is more to knowledge than its common analysis—
according to which knowledge is justified and true belief. Therefore, he proposes
this case (p.122):
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And
suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive
proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins
in his pocket.
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company
assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he,
Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago.
Proposition (d) entails:
7At least, it was the case in 2003. Since then, Knobe has adopted the view that this
effect is probably more of a widespread cognitive effect than a feature of the concept of
RESPONSIBILITY (Pettit and Knobe 2009).
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(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and
accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence.
In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones,
will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten
coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition
(d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then,
all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that
(e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for
(e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while
Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and
bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom
he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.
Gettier thus concludes that the “justified true belief” account of knowledge is
inadequate.
As Sosa (2007) points out, it is not necessary to associate the method of cases
to conceptual analysis. For instance, he suggests, cases can be used to argue for
or against any philosophical theory, including those that are not about concepts.
For Sosa and others (among which Bealer 1998; Gopnik and Schwitzgebel
1998; Ludwig 2007; Goldman 2007; Chalmers 2014), intuitions are what drives
us to make the relevant judgments on the cases. Their value comes from
our competence in making judgments—for instance, when making judgments
about concepts, these judgments would derive from our competence in using
those concepts. We might assume, in turn, that we would have acquired this
competence from living in a society that uses those concepts, or from our
experience in using this concept. As a result, the method of case can be seen as
a way to highlight those intuitions and make them explicit.
However, the proponents of an intuition-based method of cases have struggled,
over the years, to establish intuitions as sources of evidence or other epistemic
guarantees for the method of cases. Formulations of the concept INTUITION
(understood in the context of philosophical method) are numerous, although
they rarely have clear boundaries, and all the most prominent formulations have
been the target of numerous critiques. Variety in accounts of a concept is not in
itself a problem—we lack consensual accounts of many important concepts, such
as COGNITION, LIFE and DEATH, and this does not count as a failing for
the theories that rely on those concepts. But intuition-mongerers have had to
defend against charges that intuitions are too volatile to fulfill their epistemic
role (Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Machery et al. 2004; Swain, Alexander,
and Weinberg 2008) on one side and arguments that they are not central in the
practice or logical structure of philosophical argumentation (Williamson 2008;
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Cappelen 2012; Deutsch 2015; cf. also Nado 2016; Pohlhaus 2015) on the other8.
Following Machery (2017), defenders of intuitions can be broadly divided into two
broad camps9. On the one hand, there are those who would have intuitions be a
special kind of mental state or competence, whom Machery calls “particularists”
and “exceptionalists”: for them, intuitions are not just any opinion or felt state,
they are distinct in virtue of things like type of content (e.g. abstract or modal),
psychological or phenomenological properties (automaticity, speed, “being drawn
to”, etc.), etiology (e.g. came from experience, accepted competence), epistemic
status (e.g. reliable opinion), etc. The reason why we would want intuitions to
be particular or exceptional lies primarily in the mechanics of the subject/object
dichotomy as it functions in the dispatch of epistemic work: we expect one side
of the dichotomy to do one part of the epistemic work (provide evidence) and
the other to do the other part (evaluate the information, synthesize it, draw
conclusions, etc.). Mixing those responsibilities can yield paradoxes and fallacies
(Cf. Williamson 2008, 2013; Ichikawa 2009). For instance, say I grant evidential
status to intuitions, but I think of intuitions simply as being no different to
other judgments. Then using my intuition of P as evidence for my judgment
that P would translate into justifying my judgment that P as evidence for my
judgment that P . Even if we manage to work around this paradox, there is a
legitimate concern that we could be tainting our intuitions with our opinions and
motivations10. Shielding intuitions from the rest of the mental lore by affirming
their distinctness serves to avoid this kind of difficulties.
On the other hand, there are the minimalists (among whom Machery 2017;
Williamson 2008; Ichikawa 2009) who hold that the method of cases does not
require that there be a special epistemic status for intuitions. For the minimalist,
intuitions have no special phenomenology, they have no special epistemic or
semantic status, they are neither necessarily analytic or justified a priori, and
8There has been others charges against intuitions. For example, Machery (2017) argues that
they are a bit of a nomological dangler and Pohlhaus (2015) argues (among other things) that,
in the way they are formulated and employed, intuitions rely on an assumption of universality
which is epistemically noxious.
9Machery talks about three camps, but one delineation is more important that the other.
10This argument also offers an answer to the question posed by a reviewer (cf. also footnote
3): “Why doesn’t the researcher simply reflect on her concept, and produce an account of it
from her armchair?” From this point of view, armchair reflection runs the risk of contaminating
the data. As Machery (2017: 234-5) argues, probing others’ intuitions provides protection
against this risk.
A partisan of armchair methods might counter by arguing that armchair methods are rarely
confined to a single armchair, but that such conceptual analyses are actually developed in
the interaction with colleagues and graduate students. It is not completely clear that this
would solve the problem, as a researcher’s colleagues might be as motivated as her towards a
conclusion. However, even if this difficulty were circumvented, Machery argues that it might
not be reasonable to expect that the general population will share the intuitions of a small
group of philosophers, as it has often turned out not to be the case (234-5). This is why
experimental philosophers typically avoid probing philosophers’ intuitions when they want
to know what is the “ordinary” account of a concept, or the account of a wider population.
This is also why, in the following chapters of this thesis, we avoid using a corpus authored by
philosophers.
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they have no special etiology. They certainly don’t come from a different faculty,
they have no special psychological status (they can be fast and automatic, but
also slow and deliberate), and they don’t need to be obvious or conscious.
The motivation for this view largely comes from the perceived failure to pin
down specific properties that stand up to scrutiny and successfully manage to
map onto what and only what we would want to consider as intuitions. For
instance, Williamson (2008) argues that judgments obtained after some reflection
should not be less eligible to the status of intuition than spontaneous “seemings”.
Indeed, it seems to conform with what philosophers do: we don’t need a lot of
deliberation to agree that the Searle in Searle’s Chinese room does not understand
the Chinese characters he’s manipulating, but people will take a pause before
answering a trolley problem or the violinist dilemma. In a different kind of
argument, Williamson shows that restricting what we call intuitions by invoking
particularities can lead to undergeneration. His example is that we should count
it as intuitive that there are mountains, but these restrictions often lead to
categorize this statement as not intuitive. Intuitions are thus behaviourally and
phenomenologically diverse, and, as Nado (2016) notes, this almost certainly
means that we are also facing psychologically diverse phenomena. To account
for intuitions, it would seem, we need to be liberal, and accept any judgment or
opinion.
But then, minimalism (or liberalism, as Ichikawa 2009 calls it) could be facing
the same problem that particularists and exceptionalists were trying to avoid
in the first place. Opinions are exactly the kind of things that an argument
is meant to sway, so using them as evidence and as ground for said argument
seems like begging the question. Machery’s defence is to embrace what he calls
“sociological psychologism” and consider intuitions as indicators for judgments
that happen to be widely shared, as opposed to being the ultimate support of
philosophical arguments. So, while opinions from a reader or from the author
might indeed have been corrupted, we can survey the opinions of those outside
of the ivory tower, and get a good idea of what the widely shared judgment is
from participants untainted by philosophical debates.
Thus, by expanding the domain of what counts as intuition, Machery significantly
expands the domain of what can count as evidence for a certain account of a
certain concept. As he notes, the judgments provoked by common thought
experiments such as Kripke’s Gödel case and Foot’s trolley case lack the features
that mainstream particularist theories of intuition deem they should have, hence
the significance of minimalism for case-based experimental philosophy.
Given the importance that intuitions have historically had in conceptual analysis
as its source of evidence, what counts as intuition is relevant for both case-based
experimental philosophy and corpus-based conceptual analysis. However, if
it turned out that particularists were right, the method of case would simply
have to restrict the judgments it elicits, and perhaps philosophers would try to
rewrite the Gödel and trolley cases so as to elicit truly intuitive judgments. As
such, particularists do not pose much of a threat to experimental philosophy.
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On the other hand, it is not impossible that particularism about intuitions
could restrict our ability to produce data from textual corpora. Indeed, it is
not clear that, given our current level of understanding of writing, we could
discriminate or control for the linguistic behaviours observed in a text that are
not the product of intuition, understood the way a successful particularist theory
would understand it. Because minimalism advocates for an inclusive account
of INTUITION, it dispenses us with the need to determine which linguistic
behaviour reflects intuitive judgments, and which behaviour reflects non-intuitive
judgments. Minimalism makes it possible to look at all the linguistic behaviour
involving a concept that can be found in a corpus.
Haslangerian analysis
While the method of cases gives us some tools to formulate the nature and role of
empirical data in philosophical analysis, it isn’t sufficient for analyzing a concept.
What makes a proper portrait of a concept depends on what we are trying to do
with it, therefore we need tools to formulate our philosophical research projects
and derive research and evaluation strategies.
When philosophers are tasked to study thinking tools, they can be involved in
three broad types of projects. Firstly, they can study the thinking tool as it is
used. For example, they might try to give an adequate portrayal of a concept
as they believe it is used from their own understanding of the concept. They
might also try to study a corpus (as Von Eckardt 1995 did when studying the
concept of COGNITIVE). Or, as experimental philosophers have been doing,
they might design and run experiments in order to understand through behaviour
how participants conceive and employ these thinking tools.
Secondly, philosophers can study thinking tools as they work within their own
systems. This might take the form of studying a concept within a formal system.
For instance, a philosopher might study how removing the law of the excluded
middle gives rise to different regimes of logic and logical thinking. This work
has often been characterized as being a priori, but one might also think that
it is analog to building reduced models of a new plane in order to study its
aerodynamics: the idea is to play with the object to understand how it behaves
in various conditions that can be expected to arise.
Thirdly, philosophers might study a thinking tool with the express objective
to improve it. They might appreciate how the tool works in a certain context,
and wish to adapt it to another or they may believe it has a certain failing, and
wish to modify it in order to correct it. They might even think that current
tools are not getting the job done in a fundamental way, and try to build up
new thinking tools from the ground up in order to replace them. Typically,
philosophers who engage in such works have a definite idea of the function of the
thinking tools they target, and they will take measures to ensure this function is
properly fulfilled.
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Concepts are a kind of thinking tool. When we take it to be a constituent
of propositions, a concept enables the representation of a set of thoughts that
mobilize it. When we take it as holding knowledge about regularities in the world,
it enables inferences about its objects (Millikan 1998). As a result, philosophers
who study concepts can also adopt three kinds of strategies, which mirror the
three ways of approaching thinking tools in general. They are broadly those
described by Sally Haslanger (2012, chp. 13). The first one is the conceptualist
or internalist approach: it corresponds to the question, “what is our concept
of X?”—“our” corresponding to “our community”, as in the community that
is involved in using and perpetuating a concept, be it philosophers, members
of a Western society, etc. Here one might argue that once a philosopher goes
about the world asking others if they share their intuitions about a concept,
“internalist” becomes a bit of a misnomer. Nevertheless, the gist of the question
is the same: it is about achieving an understanding of concepts as they are
actually used as human thinking tools.
The second is the descriptive approach to analysis. Haslanger describes it as
being involved in understanding “what objective types (if any) our epistemic
vocabulary tracks” (p. 386). For example, a descriptive analyst might wonder if
our concept of DOLPHIN actually corresponds to what dolphins really are. Or
a descriptive analysis might inquire if what falls under the concept of DOLPHIN
should really fall under this concept. Realizing that there is no principled reason
to lump together oceanic dolphins and river dolphins, a philosopher involved
in such a project might propose that this concept should only refer to oceanic
dolphins. Thus, there is a normative aspect to this approach: if the concept being
studied is not as efficient as we might like in tracking its objective kind, then
the analyst will suggest adjustments. However, the suggestion of changing the
concept DOLPHIN here is not driven by any concern for our understanding of
dolphins or our interactions with them, but rather on the apparent disjointedness
of the category. Nor is it concerned with whether current use of the concept
DOLPHIN would require this revision. It is concerned with the workings of the
concept within its conceptual system—in other words, it studies concepts as
thinking tools as they work within their own system.
With this in mind, we might want to think that the descriptive approach should
apply not only for the referential function of concepts, but also for other functions.
Indeed, concepts don’t always refer to something, they only do when it is their
role to do so. For instance, when concepts are expressed in verbs like “apologize”
or operators like “and”, they often function to position the participants of a
conversation, or to determine how other concepts fit together in the context of a
proposition. Some concepts might even work within a formal system that lacks
semantics, and then, studying what the concept does—and whether it does it
well—isn’t about object tracking but about whether it performs the relevant
operations in the relevant contexts. As a result, perhaps “functionalist” is a
better term to describe this approach than “descriptive”11.
11Haslanger’s views are strongly realist, in that, for her, concepts like KNOWLEDGE and
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Finally, projects of ameliorative analysis12 put this function in question: “What
is the point of having the concept in question [. . . ]? What concept (if any)
would do the work best?” (p.386) In such works, we might find a philosopher
introducing a new fauna of concepts in order to achieve a theoretical goal (e.g.
Millikan 1984: chp. 1-3), or arguing for a redefinition of a concept in order for it
to fulfill a new, or a modified, role.
These three approaches are connected in various ways. For instance, there
is a sense in which all projects are ameliorative: whether someone is making
explicit how we use a concept, or what its role and operation within a system
is, this person is always making a new concept to represent what she found.
We do not encode the concept of APPLE in the same way when we use it to
recognize apples in visual stimuli or when we use it to talk and think about them.
Likewise, it is different to encode a concept simply to perform its role in a formal
system or to describe to a colleague the role it has been given in it. Inevitably,
there is change, which involves gain in the fact that the concept can be used
in new contexts (e.g. explanation, reasoning, etc.) and often some losses. In
any case, any successful conceptual analysis, whether conceptualist, functionalist
or ameliorative in its approach, will yield a new concept that is identical to
its initial target in a way, but different in that it is tailored for new contexts.
There is also a sense in which conceptual analysis always involves a descriptive or
functionalist analysis: one could not forego a careful examination of a concept’s
function and functioning before proposing adjustments, and without attending
to function, a conceptualist analysis would be a mere description of use cases.
And finally, any functionalist or ameliorative analysis ought to have a grounding
in actual use, which involves a conceptualist analysis.
This is not to say that conceptualist, functionalist and descriptive approaches are
all the same. The difference lies in the purported contribution: a conceptualist
analysis’ contribution lies in a better understanding of actual use, a functionalist
analysis must give us a better understanding of the function and operation of
the concept and an ameliorative analysis should improve on the function itself.
However, no single analysis stands by itself: a good understanding of a concept
involves a good understanding of its use, of how it operates and of its role.
This being said, to Haslanger, differences in types of analyses actually boil down
to different projects with different objects. Among them, she makes a distinction
between manifest and operative concepts. The former is typically the one that
transpires from an explicit description, like a law or a rule (e.g. “a kilogram shall
be defined as whatever weighs as much as the standard in Paris”), while the
JUSTICE have a referent that is an objective kind—not a natural kind, but a social kind. As
a result, from her point of view, all concepts that may be of interest for conceptual analysis
have referents. I’m not willing to commit to such a view, and I feel this work can be of use to
those who are also disinclined to adopt it, hence my redefinition of descriptive analysis to one
that is more tolerant of non-realist views.
12Haslanger (2012) also uses the term “analytical approach” (p. 352) in reference to a
tradition in contemporary feminist theory. But authors who reference her work mostly use
“ameliorative analysis”.
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latter is more like the often implicit, but effective characterization that transpires
from use. The object of a conceptualist analysis is typically the manifest concept,
while that of descriptive or functionalist analysis usually is the operative concept.
Meanwhile, ameliorative analysis’ object is the concept that it tries to create:
the target concept.
The problem here is that Haslanger does not provide us with a clear-cut way to
distinguish between manifest and operative concepts. While she does suggest
some criteria, they are sometimes in tension with the examples she produces.
For instance, on page 388:
Consider again my requests to Zina (my daughter) that she lower
the volume of her music. Suppose I don’t want to listen to music
with misogynistic lyrics. I have a concept of misogynistic lyrics and
I also have a rough-and-ready responsiveness to what she is listening
to. When Zina complains about my interventions into her listening,
I may come to find that my responses are not tracking misogynistic
lyrics after all, even though that’s the concept I was attempting to
use to guide my interventions. Let’s call the concept I thought I
was guided by and saw myself as attempting to apply, the manifest
concept.
In this passage, the manifest concept seems to be the conscious one, the one that
she perceives to be applied, while the operative concept is the one that actually
reflects her interventions. Indeed, as she explains a little later (p. 398):
The manifest concept is the concept I take myself to be applying or
attempting to apply in the cases in question. The operative concept is
the concept that best captures the distinction as I draw it in practice.
However, in another example, she speaks of the concept of PARENT, as in the
institution of parent-teacher conferences. A parent for a human being is usually
understood to be one of the two persons that are the immediate progenitors of a
person. However, when the school invites parents to a parent-teacher conference,
they actually mean to invite the primary caregivers of the children attending
classes. Here, there is no disconnect between the concept the school authorities
take themselves to be applying and the one that is actually applied: if asked
who counts as a parent, they would describe the caregiver, not the progenitor.
Therefore, in this example, Haslanger describes the manifest concept as “the
concept that speakers generally associate with the term”, and the operative
concept is “the concept that captures how the term works in practice”13 (p. 390).
In a further example (p. 368-370), she speaks of how her son and his school
have different definitions for the tardiness: for the school, following the official
rulebook, a student is tardy if she arrives in class past 8:25, but in practice,
teachers have different policies concerning tardiness, so a student can arrive past
9 on Wednesday and still be on time, because the Wednesday teacher will not
13By this, Haslanger probably has in mind something along the lines of “social and institu-
tional practice” rather than “linguistic practice”.
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mark her down as tardy. Once again, both of these conceptions of tardiness are
conscious and explicit (perhaps the second one is a little less so, as it would not
do to make it explicit it in some contexts, but students can certainly do so), so
the difference here rather seems to be that the manifest concept is the one that
is associated with an authority, while the operative concept is not.
If the boundary between the manifest and the operative seems to be changing,
it might because rather than being a problem, it is a feature of the dichotomy
that it is dependant on the context. In Resisting Reality, this dichotomy first
comes when she addresses theories of the concept RACE14. These theories take
conceptual analysis to be mainly descriptivist: concepts (at least the referential
kind) must map onto essences. Concerning races (as applied to humans), there is
no identifiable essence. Therefore, there are no races, and the concept RACE is
superfluous—that is, if we take the descriptivist analysis to be the only legitimate
one. Distinguishing between manifest and operative concepts enables Haslanger
to argue that there is more than one aspect of the concept, which in turn suggests
that there should be more than one possible type of analysis. This opens up the
possibility for a complementary account of RACE, that is based on the operative
concept: in such an account, race might be seen as a concept that plays a variety
of social roles, branding those who are identified with a race for discrimination
and special treatments.
Given the context in which it is introduced, it seems that the manifest/operative
distinction serves to open door rather than circumscribe the concept in a di-
chotomy. It is meant to distinguish her projects from other types of conceptual
analyses which have wrongly assumed to be the only game in town. Branding
their object as the manifest concept enables Haslanger to simultaneously frame
their contribution to a larger research endeavour, while opening up the space for
new types of conceptual analyses. But once those projects lose their claim to
monopoly or higher authority, it isn’t clear at all that the types of conceptual
variations they are interested in is systematically different to the ones they are
not interested in.
Therefore, we may read Haslanger’s contribution as being mostly critical: con-
ceptual analysis cannot be understood as transparent representation of an object
(the concept) into a descriptive language. Rather it is dependent on the kind of
purposes that we have for this description, and on how we have carved the object
(which contexts are to be included in the study). Furthermore, how concepts
function, be it in scientific or naturalistic project or in a social context, is funda-
mental: conceptualist and descriptive or functionalist projects will ultimately
aim to faithfully represent how the manifest or operative concept functions in the
contexts they wish to represent, while ameliorative concepts will try to reforge
their object into a target concept that performs the function that we want them
to perform.
But there is perhaps one fundamental dimension where Haslanger’s three types of
14This is Haslanger’s example (2012: 383-385).
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concept actually differ, and it is in what we might call their empirical grounding
(what Haslanger calls “subject matter”). While a conceptualist analysis might
produce a concept that fails to capture a natural kind and that fails to have any
noticeable effect within the discourse community for which it was crafted, it will
be judged much more harshly if it fails to capture what our concept actually
is, because it will have failed on its own terms. One might say that, by virtue
of how Haslanger’s framework divides conceptual analysis labour, conceptualist
analyses (even if they are done from the armchair) will have their empirical
grounds in phenomena that indicate how we conceive of a concept (e.g. linguistic
or categorization behaviour) and descriptivist analyses will have their empirical
grounds in phenomena that indicate something about the objects themselves.
Even ameliorative analyses will be grounded in an understanding of the context
in which concepts are meant to play as well as the role they play in it (in
particular, their purposes, the constraints that act on them, the mechanism in
which they participate, etc.). Haslanger, of course, frames this as knowledge of
the why: “why do we have a concept or belief?” And it is from the answer to
this question that the analyst can move to the central question of ameliorative
analysis: “what concept (if any) would do the work best?” It should be obvious
that without knowledge on the workings of a concept in a linguistic context
and/or in a community, any speculation on this matter would be moot.
One takeaway from this is that, firstly, all conceptual analyses have an empirical
ground, and therefore, all conceptual analyses have the potential to profit from
empirical data15. This is why even the rationalist tradition, which has been
symbolically associated with armchair speculation, has seen its proponents
attracted to various attempts to incorporate empirical data in the debate, as we
have seen in section . Secondly, analyses of every type actually have some stake
in the empirical grounds of other types of analyses, because despite the division
of labour, a successful concept has to be successful in working with the concepts
that we actually have (as opposed to the ones a philosopher might think we
have), in fulfilling its function and in being suited for the context in which it is
meant to play. This is why, for example, in the context of carnapian explication,
experimental philosophy has been proposed to play a role in informing us on
those three aspects of the concept (Shepherd and Justus 2015; Pinder 2017;
Koch 2019). Thirdly, there is nevertheless value in distinguishing among these
different types of conceptual analysis, if only to apply the right standards of
evaluation.
15Furthermore, because experimental philosophy works by provoking linguistic behaviour,
this statement also applies in principle to textual data found in corpora. Indeed, if in a study
experimental philosophers elicited linguistic behaviour that could not be found in any possible
corpus constructed from speech and writing taking from natural settings, then this would
suggest that the experiment is not ecologically valid.
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Carnapian explication
Carnap’s project lies somewhere between scientific ambitions of the conceptualist
and descriptive projects and the revisionary ambitions of the ameliorative projects.
In The Logical Foundations of Probability (Carnap 1950), for example, Carnap is
involved in clarifying concepts that scientists already commonly use: DEGREE
OF CONFIRMATION, INDUCTION, PROBABILITY. These concepts are
“usually sufficiently well understood for simple, practical purposes” (2), but
Carnap gives himself the task of reaching a more precise understanding of them
through the method of explication. Put this way, his project does not seem
revisionary: we expect those concepts to keep functioning the same way, at
least in the simple and practical purposes for which they are already commonly
employed. However, Carnap recognizes that clarifying a concept necessarily
produces a new concept: clarifying ambiguity involves determining features of a
concept, and thus modifying it. Hence, explication has both a conservative and
a revisionary aspect.
Carnapian explication describes a process by which we form a new, more precise
concept (the explicatum) from a typically less precise and relatively unscientific
concept (the explicandum). Much like Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis, the
process is described, at least by Carnap himself (1950: chp. 1), as a two-step
process16. Since the explicandum is relatively imprecise, the problem that an
individual explication is meant to solve is, at the outset, never very clear. This
is why we ought to clarify the explicandum. Carnap suggests that this can be
achieved by giving examples of contexts where we use the concept we wish to
explicate, and examples of contexts where we might think it is being used, but
where the concept mobilized is actually a distinct concept. For example: “I
mean by the explicandum ‘salt’, not its sense which it has in chemistry but its
narrow sense in which it is used in the household language” (Carnap 1950: 4-5).
Once we have clarified the explicandum as such, we can go on to provide an
explication, which “may be given, for instance, by the compound expression
‘sodium chloride’ or the synonymous symbol ‘NaCl’ of the language of chemistry”
(idem).
Furthermore, explication is usually about taking a concept from a conceptual
paradigm (or “system of concepts”, as Brun 2016 calls it) and making it available
to another. Explicating table salt with a chemical formula enables us to insert
this concept into chemical discourse. For scientific purposes, explication can
thus serve as a bridge between various models (Meunier 2017). For instance, if
we want to know whether crows are more intelligent that finches, we might need
to explicate the folk concept of intelligence into a relevant ethological framework.
From this, we might want to formalize this ethological concept of intelligence,
so that crow behaviour and finch behaviour can be made comparable. Then,
16Brun (2016) further analyses explication into a four-step process, which he obtains by
making the role of evaluation in explication more explicit. Thus, after clarifying the explanan-
dum, one should clarify how the various criteria should be interpreted in the context of the
explication, and the fourth and final step is simply a critical appraisal using those criteria.
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this formalized concept can be explicated into a physical/experimental concept
that can be used to construct experimental protocols and applied to observed
behaviour. In this string of operations, the explicator must have guarantees that,
at each transition, what has been learned about a concept from the explicata can
permeate back to the explicanda. For example, if crows do better than finches in
a set of experiments, it is through a well-constructed structure of explications
that we can convert statements about behaviours into general statements like
“Crows are more intelligent than finches” in everyday settings.
Carnap does not spell out many constraints on what an explication may be, but
he gives us the means to guide and evaluate it in the form of four criteria. The
first is similarity: the explicatum must be reasonably similar to the explicandum,
which is to say that in the contexts that count, the explicatum has to be able to
do the job of the explicandum. Then comes exactness: since this is the whole
idea of the project of explication, it stands to reason that the explicatum has
to be more exact, “so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected of
scientific concepts.” (Carnap 1950: 7). Of particular importance is the criterion of
fruitfulness, which he describes as usefulness for the formulation of universal laws
in The Logical Foundations of Probability (Carnap 1950). As Dutilh Novaes and
Reck (2017) put it, the explicatum ought to be conducive to the production of new
knowledge. Finally, the weakest criterion is simplicity—a criterion that Carnap
presents as a tie-breaker between equally good candidates for an explicatum. In
other words, an explication that is simpler (more parsimonious) than another is
ceteris paribus also better.
While the context of scientific discovery is central to Carnap’s project, it might
be useful to generalize explication beyond this restricted endeavour. This would
mean, for instance, that a concept being fruitful might mean more than just
enabling the creation or formulation of new knowledge, but that it also could
lead to some social improvements. In fact, even when restricting ourselves
to the scientific project, we can see how fruitfulness comes to represent very
different things in different cases. For example, Carnap discusses the explication
of the everyday concept FISH (which would include such things as whales
and cuttlefishes) with the scientific concept PISCES (cold-blooded gill-bearing
vertebrates17). There are things that can be said of pisces that cannot be said of
fishes (in the old sense): that they evolved from an amphioxus-like creature, that
they are chordates, etc. Because it carves nature at the right joints, this new
conceptualization enables new generalizations. Now, compare this with the kind
of explication we employ to make experimentation possible: for example, when
we explicate CONSCIOUSNESS as “the content of the participants’ experience
as she or he is able to convey it”. In such a case, the explicatum does not
shed any light on the subject matter by itself, but only because it enables the
construction of an experimental protocol. It appears that fruitfulness is not tied
to any specific way of contributing to knowledge—all that is required is that
17This is Carnap’s definition, but it is not perfect, as it would include the axolotl, but
exclude some lungfishes. Wikipedia’s Fish entry defines them as “gill-bearing aquatic craniate
animals that lack limbs with digits.”
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it enables knowledge to progress further. Therefore, employing explication for
other purposes is by no means a big stretch18.
As a referee of Dutilh Novaes (2018) notes, it is easy at this point to imagine that
ameliorative analysis and explication might, to a certain degree, be fruitfully
thought of as being approximately the same. Dutilh Novaes initially counters
by noting that explication projects can be pursued within any approach of
conceptual analysis that Haslanger describes, including conceptualist or descrip-
tivist/functionalist approaches. She also notes that in exactness, explication
possesses a criterion that is absent from Haslangerian analysis, and that, in
turn, ameliorative analysis employs tools, such as ideology critique19, that are
absent from explication. However, on the one hand, if some descriptivist projects
can also be explications, perhaps it is that descriptive analyses could also be
described in terms of an ameliorative analysis, with the goal of the amelioration
being of a scientific nature (perhaps “carving nature at its joints”, or promote
a goal that would lead to new knowledge down the line). On the other hand,
Dutilh Novaes argues that explication and Haslangerian ameliorative analysis
should take inspiration on each other, which is testament to the fact that their
respective virtues are not restricted to the domains of issues from which each type
of analysis originates. Perhaps, down the line, we will see explication projects
that include ideology critiques, and ameliorative analyses that make attempts
at formalization, such that they will become indistinguishable. Furthermore,
neither Haslanger nor Carnap mean to define their respective forms of analysis.
As we mentioned, Haslanger’s trichotomy seems to be aimed at opening the
stage for new types of analysis, rather than closing down the possibilities to
three rigid types of projects. Carnap, on his side, formulated his criteria in ways
that could afford a variety of interpretations. Therefore, while we can agree
with Dutihl Novaes that explication and Haslangerian analysis are still different
things, it is not clear that it should remain so.
This said, there is at least one sense in which explication goes farther than
haslangerian analysis, and it is in its capacity to link concepts from different sys-
tems of concepts in a relation of identity. Haslanger takes Appiah’s descriptivist
analysis of RACE and her own ameliorative analysis of it to be about the same
18Some might argue that the move would affect the exactness criterion. Indeed, the
association between exactness and scientificity might seem like a natural one, but it isn’t clear
that it actually applies more specifically to scientific discourse. Brun (2016: 1222) argues
that exactness is about such various objectives as reducing ambiguity (including reducing the
amount of cases where we can doubt whether a concept applies or not), not leading to paradoxes
and allowing for finer and more precise descriptions. Unlike Dutilh Novaes (2018), I don’t
think we should read the exactness criterion as a call for formalization. Beyond the connection
with Enlightment ideals (Carus 2008), the conceptual hygiene that is evoked through the
criterion of exactness does seem like a practical necessity for entertaining the desideratum of
fruitfulness: how could we affirm that a new concept is fruitful, if we ignore whether it will
lead to paradoxes or if we do not know how it will behave in limit cases? Furthermore, these
are all important preoccupations in Haslanger’s politically motivated ameliorative analyses as
well.
19Ideology critique is an analysis that is focused on the thinking tools like concepts and
narratives that we employ to navigate the world. Cf. Haslanger (2012: 17-22).
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concept. However, there is little substance about this identity, which goes from
having its extension in things like genes and phenotypes to things like social
representations and dynamics. Through Carnap’s account of similarity, which
be unpacked in section section , we can explain why conceptualist, descriptivist
and ameliorative analyses can give different but equally valid accounts of the
same concept.
Unsurprisingly, explication’s binding powers also come in handy with experi-
mental philosophy and corpus-based conceptual analysis, where it connects the
language of the hypothesis to the language of experimentation. As a conceptual
analysis project mobilizes a corpus in order to answer its questions, it must go
from the concept as it lives in the context that has motivated the conceptual
analysis to a concept that lives in its empirical domain. Most importantly, the
connection between the origin concept and the target concept must be artic-
ulated in such a way that discoveries on the empirical side can translate into
insights for conceptual analysis. Articulating an explication means articulating
the conditions under which what can be said about the explicandum can also be
said about the explicatum, and vice-versa.
Conceptual analysis for Alice
One interesting recent development in empirically-informed methods of concep-
tual analysis is a novel interest in articulating methods that have mostly evolved
separately. Dutilh Novaes (2018) has investigated the intersection of explication
and haslangerian amelioration analysis and has argued for convergence, and
Machery (2017: 215-7) draws a similar parallel. Meanwhile, Shepherd and
Justus (2015), Pinder (2017) and Koch (2019) have explored the possibility of
using experimental philosophy to inform explication—though the main prize
might have been to provide experimental philosophy with a method that avoids
intuitions and its pitfalls.
The consensus, so far, has been that syncretism is probably a winning strategy for
the development of conceptual analysis. After all, in articulating explication and
haslangerian analysis, we have seen that we gain from an extension of the available
tools on both sides (Dutilh Novaes 2018); we also gain Haslanger’s insight into
the division of labour, and carnapian explications capacity to articulate the
different accounts of a single concept that are conceived through conceptualist,
functionalist and ameliorative analyses. Similarly, experimental philosophy
contributes empirical grounding to explication, while explication brings in a way
to connect concepts from philosophical discussions into the experimental (or
observational) realm, thus foregoing the need for intuitions.
I find no reason to doubt this consensus. As noted in the previous section,
haslangerian analysis and explication are formally the same. As such, adopting
Dutilh Novaes’ strategy of recuperating insights and tools of inquiry from both
sides makes sense. Thus, a syncretic analysis would probably employ the
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elaborate methods devised for carnapian explication (Cf. Brun 2016), but it
would also have to position itself with regards to the division of labour, and
use this position to leverage the information from other types of analyses of the
same concept in order to improve upon itself.
However, syncretism might be a bit more difficult to achieve when it comes to
determining how empirical data can inform analysis. For Shepherd and Justus
(2015) and Koch (2019), experimental philosophy (and, we can assume, textual
data analysis as well) can inform the explication preparation phase, where one
has to get a clearer account of the explicandum. For Pinder (2017), on the
other hand, the contribution experimental philosophy can make to explication
preparation is too small to make it worthwhile, and the way should rather be to
use experimental philosophy to probe the conceptual environment to which the
explicatum is destined in order to predict if it will be successful enough to be
adopted by the community. Koch (2019) disagrees, finding uptake to be a poor
indicator of success, and judging Pinder’s plan difficult to materialize.
That being said, taking into account the division of labour in conceptual analysis,
it seems that the most productive contribution of experimental philosophy for an
explication should depend on the kind of explication. If we are in a conceptualist
project, then the explication preparation is certainly the most important step,
as the goal of the explicatum is to enlighten us on the explicandum. On the
other hand, while we might agree that uptake might not be a good indicator of a
concept’s quality, an empirical study of the explicatum’s conceptual environment
is crucial for an ameliorative project, as we need to predict how the modified
concept will play in it. As such, the debate between Sheppherd, Justus, Pinder
and Koch is probably misguided.
Finally, one might wonder where the method of cases fits in this picture. Mach-
ery’s (2017) take is that an overly aprioristic method of case, whereby philosophers
only investigate their own intuitions and that of their friends, is empirically
underpowered and might beg the question. His solution is to study intuitions on
more representative samples, which then enables him to adopt a minimalist view
of intuitions. As such, because it enables the full breadth of textual data from
corpora to be taken into account, this solution also does a lot towards making
corpus-based conceptual analysis practicable.
Thus, we might describe a syncretic method of conceptual analysis as follows.
To Alice, a conceptual analysis might start with an inquiry into the problem
she’s facing20. Firstly, she needs to clarify her problem—in particular, as Carnap
suggests, she needs to clarify which concept she wishes to analyze (we will call
it the original concept). She might also want to determine whether her project
is ameliorative, conceptual or descriptive, and determine how her conceptual
analysis might play in the philosophical debates in which she wishes to engage.
From this, she will have an idea of the discursive and pragmatic space that the
concept that will be constructed in the analysis (let’s call it the target concept)
20Here I take inspiration from Brun’s (2016: §3) “recipe” for explication.
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will have to inhabit. Hence, she can determine what purpose the target concept
is meant to fulfill. From the knowledge of the target concept’s purpose and
purported context, she can infer constraints: form of representation, contexts
where it needs to play the same function as the original concept, degree of
exactness, etc. There will likely also be constraints that are specific to the
function the target concept is meant to fulfill. For instance, if the target concept
is meant to represent in a theoretical discussion a concept as it is used in a
corpus, it will only be adequate if it efficiently reflects the original concept, and if
Alice can be justified in thinking so. If, on the other hand, she wants to improve
on a concept as it is used in a corpus, she will need to highlight how the original
concept performs its function, and where it could be improved.
From this, Alice can plot a path getting to the target concept. In her case, this
means that she will first need to determine what kind of corpus she needs to
construct. On the one hand, from the way her project is formulated, she will be
able to draw conclusions as to which set of assertions are relevant. For instance,
she might want to have a corpus that is representative of the linguistic and
discursive behaviour of the community that uses the original concept. Then,
she needs to determine what kind of contexts are contexts where the original
concept is present—that is, performing the discursive functions that are relevant
to the question at hand—and which contexts are actually good indicators for
the concept being analyzed. While Machery argued that there is no reason
to demand that she discriminates according to, say, the mental faculty that is
involved in applying the concept, there might be cases where a concept would
appear to be associated to another concept only for discursive reasons that
fall outside of its function: for example, if our corpus is collected during the
2018 World Cup, the concept STADIUM might seem strongly associated with
the concept RUSSIA, but this does not reflect on the function of any of those
concepts.
Finally, from observations and experiments on the corpus[], Alice can propose a
target concept that fulfills the criteria as previously stated and interpreted, and
evaluate how well the new concept fulfills its objectives.
Similarity
Between the vagueness of the terms employed to theorize conceptual analysis and
the difficulties that arise in operationalization, theoretical and methodological
difficulties abound—which is why we can only rejoice in the increasing interest
philosophers have been putting into method and metaphilosophy. In the rest of
this article, we will be concerned with a pair of related problems with regards to
similarity.
The first problem is about identification between the original concept (in Carnap’s
words, the explicandum) and the target concept (the explicatum): how should
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we understand this relation? Which requirement comes with it? It might
seem that this problem is sometimes treated a bit lightly. For instance, in the
Logical Foundations of Probability, Carnap (1950) insists that the requirement of
similarity should be flexible (although he doesn’t give any limits to this flexibility)
and in “Replies and systematic expositions” (Carnap 1963), he proposes that
if we interpret similarity as synonymy, we should allow at least three different
senses of synonymy to be employed, depending on the context. Haslanger, on
her part, does not explicitly address it, and Machery sees it as merely embodying
a form of conservatism: “Concepts should not be modified without reason, and
when they are modified they should be modified as little as possible” (Machery
2017: 215).
Surely, however, similarity is about more than just conservatism. Take cases
where the target concept is meant to play a role for the original concept: for
example, cases where the target concept is an explicatum that enables us to do
experiments. Here, the objective is to learn new things about the target concept
that will also apply to the original concept. Such a transfer from target to
original concept supposes that the two concepts are similar enough that, barring
some constraints, properties of one concept can be justifiably applied to the
other. Inversely, in order to fulfill their role, the new concepts need some of the
information that is contained in the old one. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a case
where we don’t want to transfer knowledge or functions from an original concept
to the target concept. There is more at stake here than, say, prevent costly and
unnecessary change: we need to justify the transfers between original and target
concepts.
The second problem hits closer to home for philosophers who (like Alice) practice
conceptual analysis with empirical data, and perhaps observational data in
particular: how exactly are we justified in identifying two instances of the use of
a concept as two instances of the use of the same concept? For example, how
can we feel secure in thinking that two cases of thought experiments mobilize
the same concept, or that the concept they mobilize is the concept we wish to
inquire? Alternatively, in corpus-based conceptual analysis, how can we feel
justified in thinking that two segments exhibit traces of the presence of the same
concept?
These two questions could have demanded two distinct answers. Indeed, the
causal threads which link concepts in those two questions might be of different
nature: in a deliberate conceptual analysis like an explication or an ameliorative
analysis, the target concept is constructed from the original one, whereas the
dynamics of concept diffusion, drift and repeated reinterpretation that occurs
naturally in a community are much less deliberate and likely are the result of a
very different, natural evolution. As a result, we might expect that what unites
and distances concepts in those two contexts would turn out to be very different.
However, as we shall see, there is a single answer to these two problems.
In the rest of this section, we will assess various propositions for establishing
how similar or dissimilar concepts can be: firstly, by similarity of intension,
25
then by similarity of extension, and then by similarity in function. “Intension”
and “extension” are terms that tend to take different definitions depending who
you are speaking to. However, generally speaking, intensions correspond to the
internal content or the essential properties of a term or a concept. For instance,
if the concept is determined by a definition, it would be that definition; if it is
a cluster concept21, then it might be a list of properties, perhaps along with
weights representing the importance of the property for a object instantiating the
concept. For our purpose, intension shall be a representation of the properties
germane to a concept. Extension is more straightforward: it is the objects that
the concept is meant to represent. For our purpose, the extension of a concept
is the set of possible objects that would be its instances if they are/were real22.
I will argue that there are major issues with similarity of intension, and extension
that make them poor candidates for the similarity criterion. On the other hand,
not only is function more apt to account for the similarity in a diversity of
contexts, but it comes with a perk: it afford natural cutoff points for judgments
of identity.
Similarity by intension
The question of similarity touches on the question of what is fundamental in a
concept. When we say that humans are similar to chimpanzees, it often comes
with some kind of evidence: sometimes, it is about DNA (“we share 98% of
our DNA”), sometimes it is about ancestry (“they are our closest relatives”),
sometimes it is about phenotype, behaviours like problem-solving or social mores
or cultural transmission, etc. Whatever is mentioned, it usually is deemed
fundamental, at least in the discursive context, of what it is to be a human or
a chimpanzee as species. Of course, if we believe that chimpanzee or human
essence (as species, of course) lies in DNA, phenotypic comparisons are not out
of question, as genotype is a huge factor in determining phenotype, and, ceteris
paribus, individuals with similar genotypes also have similar phenotypes. But if
we can, we might as well hear it from the horses mouth, and check genotypic
similarities. As such, we can assume that philosophers who think that a concept
is its intension will also think that concepts which are similar to each other are
concepts whose intensions are similar.
Those who see concepts as being intensions typically think of a concept as
being its essential properties or predicates (with what is essential being largely
dependant on what one believes to be the essential role of a concept in an
organism’s cognitive economy). Essentially intensional concepts can be found in
a large variety of philosophical and scientific traditions. In traditional conceptual
analysis (e.g. King 1998), a concept just is its decomposition into necessary and
21An object instantiate a cluster concept if it possesses a certain number of the attributes
that are associated to this concept, while none of these attributes is necessary or sufficient for
instantiating the concept. Cf. Searle (1958).
22I do not assume here that all concepts have an extension, as we will be clear in section .
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sufficient conditions—a brother just is something that has both the property
“sibling” and the property “male”. In cognitive psychology, concepts take different
logical forms (Murphy 2004; Machery 2009; Harnad 2009), but they are also
characterized by a form of subject-predicate association, even if the predicate is
often fuzzy and neither necessary nor sufficient for categorization. Intensional
criteria are also common in computer science. Proponents of the method of
case are also typically fond of the intensional concept. For instance, Machery
(2017) suggests that a concept is a set of belief-like states (“bliefs”) about the
substance.
To evaluate similarity between intensions, we can encode them into digital
representations. A standard way to do this is to code properties as variables,
while a concept can be coded as a data point. In such a case, it might seem that
geometrical measures such as the euclidean or the cosine distance would be an
obvious choice to give us a good idea of how similar or dissimilar two concepts
can be. However, while it would work well for cases like prototype or exemplar
concepts, it would not work with concepts that need to be represented using
more complex forms of representation, like schemata (Minsky 1975), and that
cannot be represented as a point in a high-dimensional space without loss of
information.
This said, there are perhaps other ways of measuring similarity and difference
between digital representations that could perhaps bridge the gap between
representations of very different forms. For instance, a promising avenue might
be to think of two concepts as being a few modifications away from each other. By
computing the minimum amount of modifications needed to go from one string
representation to another, measures like the Levenshtein distance (Levenshtein
1966) and its derivatives can give us an estimation of this drift, and effectively
tell us how similar these representations are. These measures can (and often
are) easily adapted to measure differences between objects that have different
logical forms; they could therefore be adapted to measure differences between
representations of the intensions of two concepts. Furthermore, as these measures
can be adapted to measure representations in various forms, they could possibly
be applied to any concept intension, no matter its form.
However, it isn’t clear that similar intensional traces actually mean similar
concepts (let alone identical). Take the FISH/PISCES example: one might
describe a fish as an aquatic animal, whereas the PISCES intension also includes
other properties, like having a skull, a notochord and gills and lacking digits
on the limbs. Intensionally, it would seem that concepts like SIRENS (a family
of gilled limbless aquatic salamander) are a lot more similar to PISCES than
FISH is to PISCES: sirens also have notochords, skulls, gills and no digits on
the limbs, but only the last property can be expected of all fish in the old
prescientific meaning of FISH. This problem also arise in more natural settings,
as we commonly describe the same things in various ways. Berenice might think
that, essentially, water is H2O, while Charles might think of it as a transparent
liquid with the ability to quench thirst. Their intensional pictures of water
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have nothing in common, yet they have little difficulty agreeing that they are
talking about the same thing. There might be a sense of CONCEPT in which
it is relevant to say that this person and I have different concepts of WATER.
But if we are trying to understand how the community in which they both live
understands the concept of WATER, it seems like both their voices should be
included. In other words, for our purposes, intensional similarity does not seem
to do the work we would want it to do.
Similarity by extension
The obvious next step after putting intension aside is to take a look at its
externalistic twin, similarity by extension. Carnap (1950: 7), reports that this
criterion is employed by Karl Menger (1943) with definitions: “A good definition
of a word must include all entities which are always denoted and must exclude
all entities which are never denoted by the word.” It is worth noting that Carnap,
however, does not endorse this view for concepts (cf. Brun 2016).
Nevertheless, similarity by extension has some things going for it. In particular,
it would work a little better in practice, at least with the example that we just
mentioned. Whether you think of water as H2O or as a liquid that quenches
thirst, the extension remains the same. Indeed, it would seem sensible to think
that it is because these two intensions refer to the same thing that Berenice and
Charles are talking about the same thing. This said, in the FISH/PISCES case,
Carnap notes that the latter is much narrower in extension than the former, and
thus, that “they do not even approximately coincide”. However, thanks to work
pioneered by Rosch (1973), we now know that, at least in people’s minds, not
every instance of a concept counts equally: there is a sense in which a carp is
more of a fish than a seahorse, or in which an apple is more of a fruit than a
pineapple. Perhaps the proper way of measuring similarity is through a weighted
metric that gives more importance to co-extension in instances that are more
emblematic of the concept. In such regards, PISCES and FISH are certainly
similar, as they conjure the same exemplars of carps and trouts.
However, there are grounds to doubt that it is always fruitful to think of a concept
as referential (even sometimes going through great lengths to find a domain
where it can be instantiated). Quite often, it is more useful to think of a concept
as a tool, say, to structure discourse, knowledge and behaviours. For instance,
some concepts are used in ways that suggest that their main or only function
is to position an assertion pragmatically or rhetorically (e.g. APOLOGIZE
in “We apologize to our readers.”), or to convey mood or attract attention
(e.g. IMPORTANT in “This package is very important.”). If we adopted similarity
by extension, then we might be unable to use the similarity criterion on those
concepts, which might be a problem.
A way out would be to find strategies to assign an extension to every concept.
Perhaps we should force ourselves to think of APOLOGIZE as a verbal form
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referring to acts of positioning oneself in discourse, and of IMPORTANT as
having for extension the set of all things that are deemed important by someone.
One worry with this solution is that this might actually change with the meaning
of a concept. It does seem that there is something performative in calling
something important that goes beyond asserting that something belongs to
the set of things that are important. Much like explaining a joke will ruin it,
explaining why we think that something is important will not have the same
effect as calling it important.
More importantly, when concepts are abstract, we may be tempted to draw their
extensions in more than one place, all of which might be equally adequate. Brun
(2016) gives us an example of this from Stalnaker (1976):
“the proposition [a sentence expresses] will be a function taking
possible worlds into truth values. Equivalently, a proposition may be
thought of as a set of possible worlds [. . . ]”. (Stalnaker 1976: 80)
Here, PROPOSITION1 extends on functions, while PROPOSITION2 extends
on sets. Therefore the extensions for PROPOSITION1 and PROPOSITION2
are disjointed. While we should expect those two explicata to be very similar,
judging only by extensions would tell us that they are very different. It seems
that, at least for concepts which lack extension in the physical world, extensions
are not an appropriate way of judging similarity.
Similarity by function
Arguably, one of the best interpretations of Carnap’s own understanding of his
criterion of similarity is by way of comparing concept functions. Indeed:
The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way
that in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used,
the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is not required,
and considerable differences are permitted. (Carnap 1950: 7)
This “most cases” ought to be interpreted as “relevant cases” (Brun 2016; Dutilh
Novaes and Reck 2017)—i.e. relevant for the problem the explication is meant
to solve. Thus, the idea here is that in those relevant cases, the explicatum and
the explicandum are interchangeable in use, which is to say that they perform
about the same function23.
Similarity by function has much going for itself. Firstly, it avoids the prob-
lems that we ran into with intension and extension. Stalnaker’s explications
for PROPOSITION are equivalent because, even though they have different
intensions and extensions, they can still perform the same function (at least in
most contexts). While it is possible to have explications where intensions and
23Here, function has a sense similar to “purpose” or “role”, and is not closely related to the
mathematical function or the function in computer science. Therefore, we should not think of
this functionalism in the traditional way. Cf. Millikan (1984: 18).
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extensions are completely different in explicandum and explicatum, there still
needs to be functional overlap: for a piece of knowledge to be applicable to both,
there needs to be a sentence embodying that knowledge where they play the
same function.
Secondly, even though these functions are not the traditional functionalist’s
kind23, they can be realized in multiple ways. Thus, variations between or within
individuals are not an issue. It doesn’t matter if different authors in a corpus
think of a concept in different ways: if they are using it in a similar way, we can
be confident that it is the same (or about the same) concept. This also means
that we can encode a concept in different ways (as Machery 2009 suggests) and
still be talking about the same thing, so long as there is some functional overlap.
Still, Carnap’s account of similarity by function is quite thin, and if we’re to
apply it systematically, we need more details. Functionalism about concepts can
find a more elaborate account if we mobilize Ruth Millikan’s (1984, 1998, 2017)
works, as it provides a more precise notion of “function” and a system of concepts
to go with it. To understand it, we must first understand that Millikan’s account
is tightly dependent on a peculiar understanding of the ecosystem that houses
cultural artefacts such as words and concepts.
Millikan starts from the realization that words, concepts and other cultural
artefacts are subject to evolutionary pressures of sorts. On the one hand, they
are subject to replication: effectively, we use the words, concepts and other
linguistic devices that we have encountered before, so we are replicating the
communicative behaviour we have seen in others. On the other, replication is not
perfect. If Debra teaches a concept to Eleanor, Eleanor might retain a slightly
modified version of the concept, or might even use it in slightly different ways.
Debra herself might use a concept in a standard way on most days, but might
get creative in certain circumstances, and count on the intelligence and culture
of her audience to play with that concept’s meaning. Therefore, there is also a
space for innovation and semantic drift.
Furthermore, replication does not happen randomly: if we replicate a concept,
a word or another language device (as Millikan calls them), it is because we
wish to accomplish something, and the language device helps us accomplish that
something. Another way of saying it is that we replicate them for a certain
function. The function in virtue of which linguistic device is replicated is what
Millikan calls this device’s “proper function.” That is, the proper function is not
necessarily the function in virtue of which a specific instance of a linguistic device
has been used, but rather the function in virtue of which the linguistic device
is being replicated in general in a linguistic community. In other words: the
function that ensures that a linguistic devices remains alive in its community. So,
to take an example: what identifies a word is its proper function—the function
that ensures its being replicated across time and contexts. Depending on the
context, “happy” can express a lasting contentment or an ephemeral joy: these
two “happy” express different things, have different functions, and therefore are
actually different words despite their being associated with the same morpheme.
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The nature of linguistic communication, with its requirements for some sort of
alignment between speakers and hearers, creates what Millikan calls “stabilizing
proper functions” or “standardizing proper functions.” Indeed, under normal
conditions, the function of a language device ought to be of value for both
the hearer and the speaker, or else the exchange would collapse for lack of
cooperation. This implies a certain uniformity in function: if the speaker wants
a certain reaction from the hearer, she better stay conservative and employ
language devices as they are most employed. Inversely, if the hearer wants to
extract the right information from the exchange, she will want to use conservative
interpretations.
Now, how should we account for concepts and their functions in such an ecosys-
tem? For simplicity’s sake, let us first consider words once again. To Millikan,
a word alone has no proper meaning of its own; rather, meaning is imparted
to sentences (1984: 80), and words have meanings in the context of sentences.
Sentences are themselves constructed by replicating syntactic forms—that is,
patterns of word arrangements that serve specific rhetorical purposes. For in-
stance, “Long live the revolution!” and “Down with the tyrant!” share a simple
syntactic form, where the first slot serves to express a sentiment towards the
object that is in the second slot. Other syntactic forms, like “Would you . . . ?”,
“Could you . . . ?”, “I would like . . . please.” need to be adapted to (and with)
other syntactic forms in order to construct a proper sentence. Thus, the role of
word in a sentence is mediated by the syntactic form that inserts themselves in
the sentence.
While it may happen that a conceptual analysis actually analyzes a word (in
Millikan’s terminology) rather than a concept (indeed, Brun 2016 argues that
Carnap explicitly accounts for this possibility in the context of explications),
prototypical conceptual analyses from Carnap and Haslanger portrait concepts
as accomplishing a lot more than just sentences. Millikan’s concept of WORD is
tightly associated with lexical forms on the one hand and sentences on the other.
It is close to what computational linguists call “sense”: a single semantic unit
associated with a word or expression. On the other hand, Carnap and Haslanger
see concepts as structuring discursive, scientific and political practices in general.
For instance, PISCES organizes entities in such a way that makes it possible to
make new true statements about them, and Haslanger’s concept of PARENT
acts as a sort of gatekeeper for some social institutions and practices.
What about concepts? Millikan does have a concept of CONCEPT, but it is
not quite what Carnap and Haslanger are talking about when they are talking
about concepts. For Millikan, most of the time, “concept” is short for what she
calls “empirical concept” (her writing implies that there might be non-empirical
concepts, but to my knowledge, she never really develops this notion). Empirical
concepts are public ways of referring to kinds or properties: they are shared like
words, and they can be used to identify the entity they refer to as well as hold
information about it (Millikan 2017: 47). As such, at its core, such a concept
is the ability to categorize between instances and non-instances (Millikan 1984:
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253), but because this ability is dependent on what I know about the concept, it
is also the set of information that we have about its object(s).
However, on the one hand, Millikan herself has recently rejected her concept of
CONCEPT (Millikan 2017: 49: “my claim is that there are no such things as
empirical concepts”). On the other hand, even if we were to argue against her
that there really were such things as empirical concepts, much like Millikan’s
concept of WORD, this concept of CONCEPT does not fulfill the role that we
need it to fulfill. Not only does it differ with the concept of CONCEPT that is
employed in conceptual analysis, but it fails to account for many of the concepts
we may wish to study. Indeed, if there are such things as concepts that do not
refer, we would like to be able to account for them. Thus, Millikan’s concept of
CONCEPT might be too restrictive for our purposes.
This does not mean that we should abandon the idea of a concept of CONCEPT
that is functionalist in a millikanian sense. Millikan provides us with an elaborate
system of concepts to talk about cultural artifacts in terms of proper functions
and selection; there is no reason why we should not be able to construct a
concept of CONCEPT out of it that satisfies our needs.
Millikan (1984) puts a strong focus on language, but she addresses questions
that are narrowly focused on relatively esoteric topics of philosophy of language
using concepts that have a much wider applicability. In the first three chapters,
she constructs a set of concepts meant to talk about biological and cultural
artifacts in terms of what accounts for their pervasiveness—viz. their systematic
reproduction and selection. This is where she defines such concepts as proper
functions and stabilizing proper functions. This part then serves as a theoretical
ground for the rest of the book, which is more narrowly about language, and
in particular the topics of language that drew the interest of the analytic
philosophers at the time. Millikan’s interest in, say, proper function, is thus
narrow, but her system of concepts have been applied elsewhere—including in
philosophy of biology (e.g. Schwartz 1999), epistemology (e.g. Plantinga 1993;
Nolfi 2016), meta-ethics (e.g. Wisdom 2017) and semiotics (Menary 2007).
Concepts, as they interest conceptual analysts, touch on a large and discon-
tinuous domain. They are employed in language, but not only at the level of
sentences: they are used to construct narratives, stories, tropes, arguments,
and other linguistic constructions that structure discourse and lie above the
level of sentences. They are also manifested in social, scientific and political
practices, rituals and institutions, such as laws, parent-teacher conferences and
experimentation best practices. These are all things that are reproduced in a
similar way that sentences and language devices are reproduced.
For instance, parent-teacher conferences are events that get replicated regularly
in schools across the world. To use Millikan’s terminology, they are members
of reproductively established families: because they successfully fulfill a certain
proper function, they are allowed to be reproduced, and thus form a family
of similar instances. Much like sentences (Millikan 1984: 22), parent-teacher
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conferences are formed from a variety of model: they retain forms that are
also prevalent in other meetings (like plans for orders of business, presentation
rounds, etc.) as well as forms that are relevant to the kinds of discourses or
social context which is specific to these kinds of meetings. Furthermore, they
articulate various cultural devices (parents, teachers, children, learning, child
development, speech, etc.) in a coherent whole that promotes the proper function
of the parent-teacher conference. In the same way that the concept PARENT
acquires a meaning in a sentence, the concept PARENT also acquires a meaning
in a parent-teacher conference. Indeed, concepts relate to higher-level cultural
artefacts like parent-teacher conferences or narratives in the same way words
relate to sentences: they have no proper function of themselves, but rather, they
have derived proper function from their association with other devices to form
these higher-level entities.
Therefore, we might think of a concept as the thing that composes higher-level
entities, in accordance with the role that is imparted to them by the discursive
forms24 that model the higher-level entity. It is an analog to the millikanian
word in the context of the sentence—indeed, in a sense, the millikanian word is
a special type of concept for which the higher-level entity is the sentences. If
grasping a word is grasping its proper function as manifested in the syntactic
forms that bind it to sentences, then grasping a concept is grasping its proper
function as manifested in the discursive forms (for lack of a better word) that
bind it to higher-level entities.
Now that we have placed our concept of CONCEPT in a millikanian system
of concepts, we can wonder how it helps us with similarity. If a concept is
grasped by way of its proper function, it is also individuated by way of its proper
function. Given that it is always a derived proper function—derived from the
proper function of the higher-level entities that the concept composes—we can
get a sense of a concept’s proper function through the contexts in which the
concept is used. Hence perhaps Carnap’s suggestion: a good way of getting a
sense of a concept is to enumerate relevant contexts where it is mobilized; and a
good way of comparing two concepts that are suspected to be similar is to test
whether they could replace one another in these contexts.
Another way of framing it is to consider a community where two concepts are
both used. Let us assume we have access to all the linguistic discourses they
produced (we can also assume this corpus to be indefinitely large), and know in
each instance which concept was used. Then, we could compare two concepts by
comparing their contexts—that is, the higher-level entities in which they were
involved—and the roles played within those contexts. The concepts would be
similar insofar as they play the same roles as assigned by the same discursive
forms, and insofar as they are put in the same relationship with other concepts
that are mobilized in their respective contexts.
24I think of the discursive forms as higher-level entities’ analog to the syntactic forms for
sentences.
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While we lack such capacities as that of collecting every instance of every use of
every concept in a community, or that of automatically identifying an instance
of a concept to its type in every situation, this idealization does suggest some
indicators. Carnap’s heuristic of producing assertions is one of them, but it
only seems appropriate in cases like explication or ameliorative analysis, where
the target concept or the explicatum has as of yet no real existence. Producing
assertions can serve as a form of simulation for the sake of predicting how the
new concept will function in its new environment. When we have data on how a
concept was actually used, as is the case in Alice’s scenario, we can use heuristics
to identify concept occurrences in the corpus and construct representations of
their contexts. These representations can be compared to produce an index of
similarity. This is the principle behind paradigmatic relations in distributional
semantics (Sahlgren 2008) and word embeddings in computer sciences (Mikolov,
Chen, et al. 2013), which have proved very efficient at predicting word similarities
and at uncovering semantic relationships between words. Thus, not only is
functional similarity measurable in a corpus, but its measure is a well-established
practice in corpus linguistics and natural language processing.
As we have seen, a functionalist’s similarity avoids the pitfalls that similarity by
intension or extension fall into. Furthermore, it explains why Carnap’s heuristic
for judging of similarity is a good one, and it hints at an explanation for the
success of similarity indices based on paradigmatic relations in natural language
processing. And as we mentioned, it also comes with an additional perk in that
a millikanian framework can afford a clear-cut criterion for a concept instance
to belong to a concept type.
In the spirit of flexibility, Carnap did not suggest any way of finding a cut-off
point beyond which the explicatum is too far from the explicandum for there
to be a sort of identity between the two. In the context of an explication, it
might not be too important of a problem: the idea is that any loss in similarity
ought to be offset with gains in fruitfulness and precision, so we don’t necessarily
need a cut-off point. But in the context of a corpus, it can be important to
know where a concept begins and ends, and which contexts mobilize a concept
of interest and which only mobilize a similar, but distinct, concept.
Millikan has a proposition for a cutoff point in the context of words (cf. Millikan
1984: 72-5). Words, in her account, are individualized by reference to their
genealogy—they are to be categorized with words that are reproduced from the
same lineage of previous uses of the same word type. The verb “to mean” comes
from a different etymology as the noun “mean”, which entails that they are
obviously not the same word. But “to mean” can take a variety of meanings: to
convey meaning, to intend, to be important, to be sincere or even to bring about.
Until the 19th century, “to mean” as “to be important” was not a standard
usage of the verb “to mean”. Certainly, in some context, English-speakers would
have been able to make sense of a usage of “to mean” in this sense, but they
would have understood by inferring from the proximity in meanings and from
the context. Therefore, even in the case of an abnormal usage, reproduction
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of the verb “to mean” would have been driven by the proper function of “to
mean” when it means “to convey meaning”. When it became standard for “to
mean” to mean “to be important”, then what was driving this use of “to mean”
was not the same proper function—communicative acts were not successful in
virtue of an inference from a similar meaning, but rather because audiences
were habituated to see “to mean” as meaning “to be important”. Therefore, the
driving force of the reproduction of “to mean” as meaning “to be important”
was now a new proper function. This, to Millikan, is the birth of a new word.
This kind of stabilizing proper function is what Millikan calls a least type: the
narrowest proper function that manages to drive its reproduction. The same
reasoning can be applied to concepts in general. Therefore, to determine whether
two concepts are identical, one simply needs to determine if their function can
be boiled down to the same least type.
To recapitulate, we have argued that similarity between concepts should be
understood as similarity by function. In order to clarify this proposition, we
have turned to millikanian teleosemantics and its concept of proper function,
which contributes a more precise account of function (as proper function) while
grounding it into the dynamics of communications within a community. From
this basis, we have introduced a concept of CONCEPT using Millikan’s ontology,
as an analog to her concept of WORD which can play the roles of a concept
within the realm of conceptual analysis. As such, this concept articulates its
roots in Millikan’s system of concepts with the requirements of conceptual
analysis, as we have come to understand it in section section . Furthermore, it
is haslangerian in the way we defined higher-level entities to include not only
the usual descriptive structures like propositions, theories and models, but also
non-descriptive linguistic structures and even structures that shape our political
interactions like schools and parent-teacher conferences. But it is also carnapian
inasmuch as it addresses a problem in carnapian explication.
Millikanian concepts for corpus-based conceptual
analysis
Now, we might wonder if the millikanian framework described above can actually
help with corpus-based conceptual analysis.
From a certain perspective, it could appear that this account of functional
similarity is bad news for corpus-based conceptual analysis, because functions
are not what we observe directly. In practice, we can never be certain that the
apparition of a word, for example, has been driven by the reproduction of a
certain proper function rather than an another. Furthermore, a function in this
sense harder to express than a subject-predicate association or a subset of an
extension.
However, there are reasons to think that concept as function actually makes
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things easier from Alice’s perspective. Firstly, a proper function is not about
what caused something, but about what normally causes something in a certain
environment under normal, everyday conditions. Therefore, it is not opaque: it
could not be transmitted or replicated if it were private. Furthermore, given
that we are talking about communication events, function cannot lie, say, in the
emitter alone; the reader, as a participant in the communication, also has in
principle a privileged access to the function of its components. Secondly, while
there is no straightforward way to represent a function, it might be possible to
find proxies for it. For instance, in a corpus, we might expect functions to be
associated with distributional patterns.
We can explain and illustrate these points by showing how they can be applied
in corpus-based conceptual analysis, and in the task of detecting concept in
particular.
On the one hand, we mentioned in the introduction that computer scientists
use human judgments as a way to evaluate and improve the efficiency of an
algorithm, and thus to give us confidence in its judgment. In the case of concept
detection, there is no material obstacle to asking humans to do exactly the kind
of task that we are asking the algorithm to do, and then comparing their answers.
Thus, while Alice might not have to detect concept presence by herself if an
algorithm does it for her, someone at some point has to be able to make those
judgments.
In normal conditions, if there is a shared body of linguistic devices between
receivers and emitters, humans usually have an intuitive grasp of when a concept
is present in discourse. Thus it makes sense to ask participants “Is concept
C present here?” However, there are various shades and variations to this
perception: not all concepts feel present in the same way or the same degree.
A concept may be present in the theme—for example, it might be the very
subject we are discussing about—but it can also play a supporting role in the
argumentation, or be vaguely alluded to.
So what task is it exactly that people making judgments about concept presence
are making?
It is relevant here to recall that higher-level entities can only play their linguistic
role properly if all of their constituents are taken into account. Concepts, as we
have described them above, are constituents of higher-level entities which, in the
context of a text corpus, means higher-level discursive entities, such as sentences,
of course, but also narratives, arguments, and other higher-level entities that
structure text. These higher-level entities are what embody the message—what
is being communicated. They are thus what needs to be understood in order for
the communication event to be successful. And since they are constituted by
concepts, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the receiver and emitter share
a grasp of the concepts that constitute the higher-level entity. In other words,
higher-level entities and their message cannot be transmitted without mobilizing
their constituting concepts.
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Thus, if we are faced with a message, we are faced not only with the concepts
explicitly mentioned or set on the centre stage, but also with concepts that
play supporting roles, without which the message would be different. It stands
to reason that these supporting roles are both essential to the message, and
qualitatively different from centre-stage roles. Therefore, if we wish to draw a
portrait of how a concept is being used, or of its overall function in language and
behaviour in general, our portrait of it should account for supporting roles as
much as the more glamorous ones. Therefore, our task when detecting concept
use is to get all the concepts constituting the higher-level discourse entities that
structure the text, be they centre-stage or not, explicit or not.
In normal conditions, readers should be able to pick out concepts even when they
are implicit and play supporting roles, because the understanding of higher-level
discourse entities depends on it. However, given how language purposefully
draws our attention to centre-stage concepts, this demands that efforts be made
in order to get our attention at the right place. In an annotation protocol, this
means coming up with devices to force the annotator to focus on supporting role
concepts. For example, Chartrand, Cheung, and Bouguessa (2017) came up with
a two-step annotation process. The first step is meant to build a pool of concepts
that can be used in a second step that is designed to limit the bias against
supporting role concepts: a text segment is presented to an annotator, and she
is tasked with providing five concepts that she deems to be present in the text
segment. In the second step, on the one hand, the annotator is given a concept
and a text segment, so that she cannot discriminate in favour of centre-stage
concepts. On the other hand, annotators are asked for the concept’s degree of
presence—this way, they can express that a concept is not centre-stage without
being tempted to express it by marking the concept as absent.
So, this is how our concept of CONCEPT translated into annotation protocols,
but can we leverage it for automatic processing? As we have alluded in the
previous section, millikanian linguistics offer a natural ground for distributional
semantics, which can in turn be used to make indirect representations of concepts’
proper functions.
Firstly, it useful to explain two fundamental concepts in distributional semantics:
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (cf. Sahlgren 2008).
When words are syntagmatically related, it usually means that they are en-
countered in the same documents, text segments or sentences—in other words,
syntagmatically related words co-occur a lot. This is significant because, while
full sentences don’t repeat themselves in a corpus, people usually use about
the same words to talk about the same things, and discourse about a topic is
something that is typically repeated. Thus, co-occurring words are typically
found in texts which are thematically similar (they talk about the same things).
Therefore, syntagmatic similarity between two words signals unity in the themes
we can express with those two words.
On the other hand, paradigmatically related words are words that cooccur with
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the words. Typically, paradigmatically related words can play similar roles in the
same clauses: replacing one by another might change the meaning, but it will still
mean something, and, often, this will form another sentence that is susceptible
to be found in the corpus. Paradigmatic relations thus approximate relations
of synonymy, with the caveat that antonyms are usually paradigmatically very
close, given that they differ only on one dimension and that they will play similar
roles in sentences.
Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations have been leveraged in various way
by researchers in natural language processing. Syntagmatic relations are often
leveraged in vector representations where words are represented by the documents
where they occur, or vice-versa. Through clustering, we can get groups of
documents or words that are thematically related, and groups of documents,
although topic models are now more commonly used to represent thematic units
which are linked to both words and documents. Syntagmatic relations are also
used in a large variety of tasks, including automatic summarization, information
retrieval (finding a document from a keyword query), recommendation engines,
etc. Paradigmatic relations are leveraged to make vector representations where
words are represented through other words in terms of their propensity to co-
occur, typically within a very short window. On top of finding synonyms, these
representations can be used for tasks that involve word composition, for word-
sense disambiguation (disambiguating different meanings or sense for a single
morpheme), to enhance some topic models (it is particularly useful for inferring
topics for short texts, like twitter statuses), for language models (e.g. predicting
which will be the next word), etc.
Coming back to millikanian linguistics, higher-level entities tend to reproduce
themselves (not as exact copies, as words do, but rather in the same fashion
as sentences reproduce themselves), for the same reason any linguistic device
does: they successfully serve a purpose in the social and discursive landscape
where they are enacted. Now, there are a large variety of factors affecting word
use—simply overhearing someone use a word in a conversation nearby certainly
makes us more likely to reuse this word. However, ceteris paribus, that we are
expressing a certain narrative or story, for example, will strongly determine
the words we will use to express it. This is partly because the concepts that
constitute them condition lexicon by way of favouring words that can be used to
express them, but also because playing a certain role in discourse is more readily
achieved using some types of words rather than others. For example, while they
may be argued for the same conclusions about the same themes, racist discourses
from far-right extremists and from mainstream conservative politicians usually
will not share the same vocabulary, because they are not staged in the same
settings (Van Dijk 1993).
This association of a recurring vocabulary to recurring higher-level entities could
at least partly explain the phenomenon of syntagmatic relations in distributional
semantics (Sahlgren 2008). Two documents, two sentences, or two text segments
are similar to the degree that they share the same words. This may very
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well be because, as higher-level entities condition vocabulary, sharing the same
vocabulary indicates a common involvement in expressing the same higher-
level discourse entity. Thus, ceteris paribus, similar vocabulary means shared
involvement in the same higher-level entities.
These syntagmatic relations can then be leveraged by topic models (e.g. Blei,
Ng, and Jordan 2003) and clustering algorithms (Meunier, Biskri, and Forest
2005) to find clusters of textual units that can be read as expressing the same
higher-level entity. In other words, higher-level entities are traceable in the text
because of the way they condition it and because of the lexical trace that they
leave.
Conversely, concepts, words and other linguistic devices that participate in
constructing higher-level discourse entities can be described in terms of the other
linguistic devices that participate in the same higher-level entities. This is because
variations in higher-level entities typically conserve the same discursive forms,
and these discursive forms select their constituent by their broad functions. For
instance, in “Long live the King!”, “King” can easily be replaced with “Queen”,
as they have similar functions. To a lesser degree, the same can be said of any
figure or entity that has a strong authority. Thus, association with “Long live”
in a large corpus might indicate that the word “king” and “queen” can fulfill
the same function of being the object of approval as an authority. Given that
this form can take variations, “king” and “queen” might also be associated with
“Down with”, which would indicate that they can also both function as objects of
disapproval as authority. And so on with other variations, and other discursive
forms.
As these cooccurrences accumulate, we can have a decent portrayal of the
propensity of two linguistic devices to embody the same functions: this would
correspond to the paradigmatic relations in distributional semantics (Sahlgren
2008). This explains why counting word cooccurrences in large generalist corpora
is such a good indicator of synonymy, as well as various semantic properties
of representations made this way (cf. Mikolov, Chen, et al. 2013; Mikolov,
Sutskever, et al. 2013; Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014).
Now, if the repetition of higher-level entities can predict word distributions,
then, conversely, from word distributions, we can infer, at the very least, the
probable presence of a higher-level entity. This is essentially how probabilistic
topic model work: topics are higher-level structures that are inferred to explain
word distributions. And if we assume that topics are composed of concepts,
and that their influence over word distributions is a function of the concepts
they are composed with, then we can use these word distributions not only to
identify which topics are present in a document, but also which concepts compose
these topics. This is the hypothesis that is followed in Chartrand, Cheung, and
Bouguessa (2017) and Chartrand (2019), using different models of both concepts
and topics.
Similarly, paradigmatic relations ensure that at least words can be represented
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in another way, through their close neighbours, which, as we mentioned, can act
as a proxy for function. However, we know that not only words can fruitfully
be represented on these vector spaces, but new meaningful vectors can be
constructed from word vectors. Furthermore, other entities can be usefully
modelled in the same vector space as word embeddings, as shown by the success
of algorithms like doc2vec (Lau and Baldwin 2016), which represents documents
as vectors, sense2vec (Trask, Michalak, and Liu 2015) which deals with word
sense and LCTM (Hu and Tsujii 2016), which uses a vector model for concepts to
construct topics. Therefore, there are good reasons to be optimistic concerning
the modellization of paradigmatic relations for concepts using distributional
semantics.
Thus, distributional semantics offers two ways of getting at concepts by observing
its traces in textual corpora: through the higher-level entities that they construct,
and through the modellization of functional similarity through the space of
paradigmatic relations.
In this light, it appears that accepting concept similarity by function actually
quite compatible with the main insights of distributional semantics. This, in
turns, opens up the possibility of using technology built on these foundations
for detecting concept presence automatically. As Chartrand et al. (2016) and
Chartrand, Cheung, and Bouguessa (2017) have shown, we can use syntagmatic
relations to find higher-level entities, which will in turn tell us where their
constituting concepts are likely to be present. And as Chartrand (2019) sug-
gests, recent progresses on paradigmatic relations might enable us to determine
which concepts constitute these higher-level entities. Furthermore, as works
in computer-assisted reading and conceptual analysis of text suggest (Meunier,
Biskri, and Forest 2005; Chartier et al. 2008; Sainte-Marie et al. 2011; Le et al.
2016) these techniques can also be leveraged for other aspects of corpus-based
conceptual analysis, like for representing certain aspects of the target concept.
Conclusion
In this article, two main objectives were sought. On the one hand, I pursued the
general goal of providing a theoretical framework for corpus-based conceptual
analysis. On the other hand, this general, operative objective was pursued
through a question: which account of similarity is best adapted to answer the
challenges of corpus-based conceptual analysis?
In the first section, I sought to give a general picture of how an empirically-based
conceptual analysis might be conceived and theorized. I did this through an
overview of the leading accounts of conceptual analyses as method or philo-
sophical endeavour in analytic philosophy—in particular, I reviewed Carnapian
explication, Haslangerian analysis, and some perspectives on the method of cases.
I noted that the contributions of these accounts are largely complementary,
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and used this insight to distill these contributions into a general account of
corpus-based conceptual analysis as a method.
This first section acts as a sort of introduction for the second section, whereby
the hermeneutical resources necessary for formulating the problem of the second
section are presented and put together. The second section builds on this, first
by formulating its driving question—which account of conceptual similarity is
best adapted to corpus-based conceptual analysis? Given how corpus-based
conceptual analysis has a foot in conceptual analysis and another in observation
of concepts in corpora, this question plays on two very different contexts: the
application of the similarity criterion to evaluate the target concept (or explicatum,
to use Carnap’s terminology) on the one hand, and the distinction between the
concepts’ representation in corpora on the other. In both contexts, I argued that
concepts’ similarity should be based on resemblance of their proper functions
rather than comparison of extensions or intensions. To do so, I overviewed
Millikan’s (1984) system of concept and adapted her notion of WORD in order
to account for and describe concepts as they are studied by empirically based
conceptual analyses.
Finally, in order to illustrate how the framework developed in section contributes
to the more general objective of providing theoretical grounds for corpus-based
conceptual analysis, I showed in section how the millikanian framework and
concept similarity as function can be leveraged to operationalize concept presence
detection. This was done both for concept presence detection as performed by a
human and by a computer algorithm.
As such, my contribution is threefold: (1) I provided an argumentation in
favour of assessing concept similarity by way of comparing proper functions,
(2) I provided a framework that formulates accounts of concept and conceptual
analysis for corpus-based conceptual analysis, and (3), I illustrated how this
framework is leveraged in concept presence detection.
On the one hand, this provides a theoretical basis that justifies both the way
the concept presence detection problem is formulated in Chartrand, Cheung,
and Bouguessa (2017) and the way annotations were performed. Furthermore, it
helps us better formulate the assumptions behind the algorithmic approaches
defended by Chartrand, Cheung, and Bouguessa (2017) and Chartrand (2019),
and lends some support to it.
While some work has been done to promote corpus-based conceptual analysis
(Bluhm 2013; Andow 2016), it still represents a new way of approaching philo-
sophical method within analytic philosophy, and, as such, disposes of very few
hermeneutical resources to account for itself. One can only hope that the work
presented in this paper can contribute to addressing this want—and perhaps
inspire further work in this direction.
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